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Abstract
This article derives key variables in the analysis of standards of proof
in criminal law from basic conditional probabilities. The variables derived
are the probability of correct and wrongful conviction, the expected sanc-
tion and society’s incarceration costs, while the basic conditional proba-
bilities are the probability of observing (any given) evidence against indi-
vidual i given that individual j committed the crime (for any j including
j equal to i). The variables are derived from the conditional probabilities
as a function of the standard of the proof using simple Bayesian updating.
Introduction
In the literature that models a Court’s inference concerning the guilt of a
defendant in a criminal trial1, the probability of observing the evidence given
that the defendant did commit the crime, and the probability of observing it
given that someone other than the defendant committed it are taken as basic
concepts. However, it is not clear whether these are conditional or joint proba-
bilities, and neither is the concept of the probability of observing the evidence
given that some other person than the defendant committed the crime. This ar-
ticle derives these (joint) probability distributions within a Bayesian framework
from the conditional probability distributions, which for each person assigns
the probability of observing the evidence given that the person committed the
crime. Since other key variables such as the expected sanction, the expected
number of wrongly convicted and the total number of convictions per crime
committed (which determines society’s sanctioning costs) can be derived from
the two probability distributions that are conventionally treated as basic to the
analysis, this article will also derive these variables from the conditional prob-
abilities. In all, while the analysis here will not point to errors in the existing
literature, but will rather establish the correctness of the analysis in e.g. Miceli
(1990, 1991), the aim is to ground the analysis of inference in criminal law
securely on Bayesian updating2.
1For an overview, see Polinsky and Shavell (2000).
2Experience shows how easy it is to make mistakes when modeling probabilistic inference.
Deriving probabilities from simple Bayesian updating can eliminate the potential for error.
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Basic Assumptions
It will be assumed that when a crime has been committed, the identity of the
oﬀender and not the nature of act committed is in doubt; the act will be assumed
to create harm which leaves essentially very little (in the model no) doubt that
the crime has been committed. Assault, robbery, and certain kinds of homicide
all fall into this category. The task for the Court is to infer the probability of
a person’s guilt based on the evidence, i.e. based on information concerning
circumstances of the crime (including knowledge of the process by which this
information has been provided by first the police, and then the prosecution).
The Model
Let there be N potential oﬀenders, each of whom may or may not com-
mit a crime on a given day. Whether or not an individual commits a crime
depends on his or her benefit from committing it in relation to the expected
disutility of the possibility of being sanctioned. The N individuals are assumed
to possibly diﬀer in the benefit they obtain from committing the crime under
consideration, but ex-ante, before the evidence becomes known to the Court,
they are indistinguishable from the point of view of the Court3. For simplicity,
it can be assumed that a person can only commit one crime on the given day;
the possibility of multiple oﬀenses by the same person on a given day, which is
realistic for e.g. theft will not be discussed here, although the analysis can be
extended to cover it. Moreover, attention will for the sake of simplicity focus on
the case where only one crime is committed on a given day. Naturally, the more
realistic case is where many crimes are committed each day but each crime can
then be analysed as will be done here, and information concerning the nature
and number of other crimes committed can then be included as part of the ev-
idence arising in any singly case, to the extent that it is relevant for excluding
or including possible suspects. Implicitly, when only one crime is committed on
a given day, only one individual’s benefit is greater than the expected sanction
(on that day). For consistency of the model, it should then be verified that the
expected sanction, which depends among other factors on the standard of proof
and thus on the way in which the Court infers guilt from evidence, is at a level
such that one and only one person’s benefit exceeds the expected sanction4.
This consistency requirement is easily met (since a distribution of benefits can
be assumed that meets the requirement), and the purpose of mentioning this
aspect is to stress that the commission of a crime is not a stochastic event in
the model. Thus, it may well be known by everybody that a crime will be com-
mitted each day; however, as long as the Court does not have any information
3The analysis can be extended to the case where individuals belong to sub-groups of society
with diﬀerent propensities for crime, see note ? below.
4Naturally, this can be extended to M criminal acts, where the equilibrium will be one
where the fraction of the population whose benefit exceeds the expected sanction will commit
crime.
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concerning the benefits of particular individuals the problem of inferring who
committed the crime remains. In the absence of any information concerning
individuals’ types, the Court must set the prior probability that any individual
committed the crime equal to 1/N5 .
The ex-ante probability of guilt will be updated by the Court on the basis
of the evidence arising as a result of investigative eﬀort. The evidence will be
denoted by e and will be assumed to be stochastic; for example, a witness may
stochastically show up at a crucial moment. The evidence e may be thought
of as a collection of statements and measurements (blood tests, DNA-tests,
all kinds of forensic evidence) concerning states of the world. Also, when the
Court decides on the guilt of a person, it may be relevant how the information
concerning the circumstances of the crime has been collected, why the police and
later the prosecution chose to focus on a person as a key suspect etc., knowledge
of this kind will be taken to be included in e.
In the section below, the probability of a person i’s guilt given the evidence
will be derived from the conditional probabilities of observing the evidence given
that i committed the crime and of observing the evidence given that some other
person j committed the crime. Subsequently, the probability of a correct and
a wrongful conviction will be derived (as a function of the standard of proof)
from these same conditional probabilities.
As mentioned, a Bayesian framework will be adopted in which the Court
has no ex-ante information concerning the characteristics of the N individuals.
The ex-ante probability of i committing the crime, p(i), will hence equal 1N .
This is the (unconditional) probability a Court would assign to i committing
(or having committed) the crime, before the Court knows the evidence of the
case. When receiving the evidence the Court updates its ex-ante probabilities
based on conditional probabilities of observing the evidence. It will be assumed
that for any evidence e and any individual i the Court can (in an approximate
sense) answer the following question : if i did commit the crime, what would
be the probability then for the court to receive e. For any e, there are N
such conditional probabilities, and the idea of the present paper is to develop
the other probabilities (e.g. of correct and wrongful conviction) from these
conditional probabilities. Denote the conditional probability for individual i by
prob(e | i), i = 1, 2...N.
The first variable to be determined from the conditional probabilities is the
probability of any person i’s guilt given the evidence e.
Note first that the probability of observing evidence e can be expressed by
conditional probabilities using the general formula that prob(X) = prob(X |
Y )prob(Y ) + prob(X | Z)prob(Z), when Y ∪ Z = Ω and Y ∩ Z = ∅:
prob(e) =
i=NX
i=1
prob(i)prob(e | i)
5 If a person belongs to a group with an above-average propensity for crime, his or her
ex-ante probability of guilt will, ceteris paribus, be correspondingly higher. The model can
be generalized in this direction.
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Bayes’ formula6 can then be used to derive the probability of i’s guilt given the
evidence e, prob(i | e):
prob(i | e) = prob(i ∩ e)
prob(e)
=
prob(i)prob(e | i)
j=NP
j=1
prob(j)prob(e | j)
Since prob(i) = prob(j) = 1N , the first proposition can be stated:
Proposition 1: The probability of person i’s guilt given the evidence e can
be expressed from the conditional probabilities as
prob(e | i)
j=NP
j=1
prob(e | j)
The proposition reflects the basic Bayesian logic, that the probability of
i0s guilt given the evidence is the ratio of two probabilities: the probability
of observing the evidence when i committed the crime and the probability of
observing the evidence at all. Both of these probabilities are joint, but due
to the assumption of symmetry (all a priori probabilities of guilt equal 1/N),
the a priori probabilities cancel out, and hence the ratio of the conditional
probabilities determines the probability of guilt7 .
Also, the proposition reflects in an approximate sense the way in which a
defendant’s probability of guilt is inferred in reality. In forming the probability
of guilt of the defendant, the Court will compare how compatible the evidence
is on one hand with the hypothesis that the defendant committed the crime and
on the other hand with the hypothesis that someone other than the defendant
committed the crime. Naturally, the proposition establishes an ideal benchmark
that may not be fully descriptive of actual inference; real world decision making
is unlikely to mimic Bayesian updating perfectly, one can e.g. imagine that very
small probabilities are simply left out of consideration in reality.
Note finally that the prime suspect can naturally be defined as that person
whose probability of guilt, as determined by the proposition, is the highest given
the evidence before the Court. And that the weight of the evidence for each
individual can be defined in terms of the probability of guilt which it establishes
for that individual. These two concepts, the prime suspect and the weight of
the evidence are sometimes taken as self-evident; in the present context, the
former is easily defined while the latter is not needed as a concept.
6prob(X | Y ) = prob(X∩Y )prob(Y ) =
prob(Y |X)prob(X)
prob(Y )
7 In a setting where ex ante probabilities of guilt diﬀer between individuals, these proba-
bilities would not cancel out but would remain in the expression.
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Denote by ei(p) the evidence8 that points to individual i’s guilt with proba-
bility p, i = 1, 2...N. And denote by eij(p), the event that the evidence pointing
to i with probability p occurs when j committed the crime, i, j = 1, 2...N . The
events eii(p) (for any i) concern the evidence of weight p arising against the
oﬀender while the events eij(p) where i 6= j concern the evidence arising against
an innocent individual. The probability of these events will now be considered
from the viewpoint of the Court.
The probability of one of the events eii(p) occuring (i = 1, 2...N) is the
probability that evidence of weight p comes forth against the oﬀender, sometimes
referred to as fg(p) where g refers to guilt. The events are mutually exclusive,
hence
fg(p) =
1
N
prob(e11(p)) +
1
N
prob(e22(p))...+
1
N
prob(eNN (p))
Since prob(eii(p)) is the same for all i in the present symmetric model, fg(p)
can be written 1N
i=NP
i=1
prob(eii(p)) = prob(e
i
i(p)). prob(e
i
i(p)) derives from the
conditional probabilities as follows: the evidence ei(p) that points to i as the
oﬀender with probability p is the evidence which fulfills prob(e|i)j=NP
j=1
prob(e|j)
= p, in
which all expressions are conditional probabilities, and the probability of that
evidence occurring when i committed the crime equals prob(ei(p) | i), which is
also a conditional probability.
Proposition 2: The probability of evidence of weight p arising against the
oﬀender, fg(p), equals the conditional probability prob(ei(p) | i) where ei(p)
solves (for e): prob(e|i)j=NP
j=1
prob(e|j)
= p.
The second concept to derive from the conditional probabilities is the prob-
ability of evidence of weight p coming forth against someone other than the of-
fender, fin(p). Consider the probability that evidence of weight p arises against
i when j has committed the crime, prob(eij(p)). To calculate this probability
consider the following matrix:
e11(p) e
2
1(p) e
N
1 (p)
e12(p) ....
...
e1N (p) e
N
N (p)
In this matrix, p is assumed to be greater than 12 ; conviction will not occur
when p < 12 , and restricting attention to p >
1
2 implies that events in the
matrix become mutually exclusive as the evidence cannot point to two people
with probability greater than 12 .
8 It can be assumed without loss of generality that two diﬀerent constellations of evidence
do not produce the exact same probability of guilt.
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The events in the diagonal represent evidence pointing to the oﬀender with
probability p. The probability of these events was calculated above. Oﬀ the
diagonal, the evidence points with probability (greater than 12) to the guilt of
someone other than the oﬀender. Hence, of interest is the sum of the probabil-
ities of the events oﬀ the diagonal:
NX
i=1
X
j 6=i
prob(eij(p))
The probability of evidence of weight p arising against i when j committed the
crime equals the conditional probability prob(ei(p) | j) where ei(p) solves (for
e): prob(e|i)j=NP
j=1
prob(e|j)
= p. That is, when the Court attaches probability p to i having
committed the crime, it is because the evidence is such that prob(e|i)j=NP
j=1
prob(e|j)
= p,
and this evidence ei(p) occurs with probability prob(ei(p) | j) when j committed
the crime.
The probability of observing evidence of weight p against i given that j
committed the crime, prob(ei(p) | j), is by symmetry of the model the same for
all pairs (i, j) where j 6= i, and we can hence denote it by a common expression
fij(p). The probability that this event occurs is then 1N fij(p) where
1
N is the
probabiliy that j commits the crime. Hence,
P
j 6=i
prob(eij(p)) =
P
j 6=i
1
N fij(p) =
N−1
N fij(p), and
NP
i=1
P
j 6=i prob(e
i
j(p)) = (N − 1)fij(p).
Proposition 3: The probability fin(p) of someone other than the oﬀender
being suspected with a probability of guilt equal to p, where p > 12 , equals
(N −1)fij(p) where fij(p) is the conditional probability that evidence of weight
p will come forth against i given that j committed the crime.
Note that since fij(p) has been derived from the basic conditional probabil-
ities, so has the probability of wrongful conviction.
It may be thought that (N −1)fij(p) increases with N and cannot therefore
be a probability, but when N increases, fij(p) decreases correspondingly, since
the probability for each person to be wrongly convicted of a given crime falls
with the size of the population.
Proposition 2 and 3 derive the probabilities fg(p) and fin(p) from basic
conditional probabilities. The analysis now turns to the probability of correct
and wrongful conviction derived as a function of the standard of proof q, which
is the treshold probability of guilt beyond which the Court convicts. Note that
fg(p) and fin(p) are well-defined when p > 12 , and that it is natural to restrict
attention to q > 12 for criminal trials. In the following it will be assumed for
convenience that p varies continuously such that total probabilities of conviction
can be expressed by integrals.
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A defendant is convicted when p > q, hence:
Proposition 4: The probability that the oﬀender is convicted equals
1R
q
fg(p)dp
Naturally, it follows that the probability that the oﬀender is not convicted,
from which victims may suﬀer an unfairness ‘cost’ equals 1−
1R
q
fg(p)dp.
From the probability of convicting the oﬀender the expected sanction from
committing the crime can be derived, central of course to the deterrent eﬀect.
Proposition 5: If the sanction is s, the expected sanction equals s
1R
q
fg(p)dp9 .
It may be argued that deterrence is aﬀected not only by the expected sanc-
tion but also by the probability of unfair conviction. However, in the present
model, individuals do not risk conviction of a crime they do not commit, since
the existence of a crime is not in question, and therefore an individual should
not consider this risk when abstaining from a crime. And he or she may be
wrongfully convicted of another’s crime whether or not he or she commits a
crime. Hence, the risk of wrongful conviction can be assumed not to aﬀect the
incentive for crime (for a further discussion, see Lando (2004)).
The risk of wrongful conviction follows in an equally simple way from the
fin(p) function:
Proposition 6: The risk that someone is wrongfully convicted equals
1R
q
fin(p)dp
From proposition 4 and 6 follows the probability of conviction on a given day.
Since a conviction is either correct or wrongful, the probability of a conviction on
a given day is the sum of the probability of correct and of wrongful conviction.
Proposition 7: The probability of conviction on a given day, from which
society’s incarceration costs can be derived, equals
1R
q
fg(p)dp+
1R
q
fin(p)dp
Summary
Two sets of questions have been analysed. The first concerns how a Court
should infer the probability of guilt from given evidence before it. The sec-
ond concerns how the standard of proof aﬀects the probability of correct and
wrongful conviction, the expected sanction and the expected incarceration costs,
9Note that one does not risk conviction of a cirme not committed when the existence of a
crime is not in question, and that the risk of wrongful conviction therefore does not aﬀect the
incentive for crime. On this point, see Lando (2004).
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where all possible evidence that might arise in the wake of a crime should be
taken into account. It is well-known from the law and economics literature (see
e.g. Miceli (1990) and (1991)) that both sets of questions can be answered from
two probability distributions: the probability of observing any given evidence
against the oﬀender and the probability of observing it against someone other
than the oﬀender. This article has derived these probability distributions from
the conditional probabilities (one for each set of evidence and for each pair
of individuals (i, j)) of observing the evidence against i when j (who may be
identical to individual i) committed the crime.
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